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Summary  findings
Because of politics, some economic policy reforms are  resist privatization, fearing that such reform will reduce
adopted and pursued in the developing world and others  their economic "rents." More social groups and power
are delayed and resisted. Economic reform is inherently a  points thus oppose privatization than favor it, so this
political act: It changes the distribution of benefits in  policy reform is likely to be delayed or not implemented
society, benefiting some social groups and hurting others.  at all.
Social groups may oppose reform because of doubts  However, social groups do not possess an absolute
about its benefits or because they know it will harm their  veto over economic reform, and policy reform can (and
economic interests.  often does) occur despite the opposition of certain social
Adams shows how three types of reform-currency  groups. It depends on the aggregate political weight of
devaluation, the privatization of state enterprises, and the  the groups opposing reform.
elimination of consumer (food) subsidies-affect  the  For example, as Adams shows, five social groups either
utility of nine different social groups (including  wholly or partly oppose eliminating consumer (food)
international financial institutions).  subsidies, but the combined weight of those groups is
When governments try to privatize state-owned  only roughly equal to the political weight of the four
enterprises, for example, more social groups with greater  social groups-international  financial institutions, the
political weight are likely to be disadvantaged than  ruling elite, urban politicians, and urban capitalists-that
helped. Urban workers, urban bureaucrats, urban  favor this reform. Politically, consumer subsidies can be
students, and the urban poor are likely to "lose out" and  eliminated or reduced if the right kind of concern is
will strongly oppose privatization. But the ruling elite  shown for opposing social groups.
and urban politicians are also likely to at least partly
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While some attempts at economic policy reform are adopted and pursued in the
developing world, other efforts at reform are delayed and resisted.'  For instance, despite
the positive contribution that policy reforms like currency devaluation, privatization of
state companies and elimination of consumer subsidies might make to trade and budget
deficits and general economic welfare, a recent study by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) found that "economic reform remains incomplete and external viability elusive" in
many developing countries (IMF, 1993: 40).  What are the reasons for the adoption of
some types of economic reform, and the resistance to other reform policies?  This article
tries to explain this phenomenon by reference to:  the content of different reform policies,
the differential impact of these policies on competing social groups, and the political
weight of social groups favoring and opposing reform.
In recent years the economic literature has posited two basic reasons for the
resistance to economic reform in some countries. Each of these explanations has been
based on the heterogeneity of group interests in society and the uncertainty that different
groups have about the net benefits of reform.
In the first explanation, there is a conflict between social groups over how the
known cost of economic reform will be divided (Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Alesina and
Drazen, 1991). In this approach, although each social group knows the net benefit that it2
would receive in a policy change, each group is uncertain about the net benefits other
groups will enjoy through  reform.
In the second approach, the key concept is that some social groups are uncertain
about the benefits they themselves will enjoy if a particular economic reform is adopted
(Rodrik 1996, 1113;  Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). In this approach, reforms tend to be
resisted, and the "status quo" extended, because of the uncertain distributional effects of
policy change.
This article presents a framework which encompasses both of these explanations,
while at the same time broadening and extending these approaches in five key ways.
First, the analysis emphasizes the positive:  in many instances, resistance to reform has
been overcome and economic reform policies have been implemented.  Second, this
analysis brings to the fore the notion of politics:  in most developing countries economic
reform is as much a political as an economic issue.  Economic reform is inherently
political because by changing the distribution of benefits in society, economic reform
benefits some social groups and harms others. 2 Third, in the economic literature the
decision calculus of politicians in choosing to implement economic policy reform is
seldom specified.  This analysis seeks to remedy this omission by modeling how
politicians pursue reforrn through their interactions with competing social groups.
Fourth, in the economic literature, resistance to reform is often viewed in terms of the
distributional conflicts between two or three social groups. 3 However, in the real world
society is composed of more than two or three stylized groups, and these social groups
have different political power or weight in the reform process.  The key, then, to3
understanding why policy reforms are implemented and/or delayed is to identify both the
political weights of different social groups and how these groups are affected by various
types of reform.  Fifth, this article broadens the notion of social group heterogeneity by
incorporating ideas from the rent-seeking literature.  According to the rent-seeking
literature, "the govermment  apparatus is employed to create and extract rent" (Mbaka and
Paul, 1989) and politicians are considered as "brokers of wealth transfers between the
various interest groups" (Kimenyi and Mbaka, 1993). In this approach, national
politicians (and government bureaucrats) become social groups in their own right,
"selling" access or control of the government apparatus to other social groups.  Since the
process of economic reform is likely to deprive politicians and government bureaucrats of
the "rents" they receive as brokers, these two social groups may try to delay or resist
policy reform.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the nine social groups in the
model.  Sections 3 and 4 analyze the utility of each social group with and without rent-
seeking. Section 5 describes the political weight of each social group, and Section 6
analyzes the decision calculus of politicians for undertaking reform.  Section 7 then
applies the model to three specific types of economic reform:  currency devaluation,
privatization of state-owned companies, and elimination of consumer (food) subsidies.
These sections show how different types of policy reform have a differential impact on
competing social groups, and how summing up the political weights of "advantaged" and
"disadvantaged" social groups shows whether or not a particular reforn  will be
implemented or opposed.  If a particular reform engenders enough opposition among4
social groups with large political weight, that reform will be delayed and/or not
implemented.  Section 8 summarizes these, and other, findings of the study.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that this paper abstracts from the country
case-study approach in the sense that it presents few specific examples from developing
countries.  Clearly, the impact of economic reform on social groups will vary
considerably from country to country, and so will the ability of these different groups to
adopt or resist reform.  While in the past considerable attention has been focused on the
political economy of reform in specific developing countries, 4 few of these studies have
explicitly sought a broader understanding of the role that differently weighted social
groups play in supporting or resisting the reform process. 5 This paper consciously seeks
to produce a broad, political economy map of how social groups with different political
weights affect the process of economic reform.
2.  The Model
There are nine different social groups in our stylized economy.
1. An external group of international financial institutions (group i), which urge or
promote economic reform;
2.  A ruling elite (group e) within the country, responsible for deciding if and when
to pursue economic reform;
3. An urban group of politicians (group p);
4.  An urban group of capitalists (group k), producing industrial goods M;
5. An urban group of workers (group w);5
6. A group of government bureaucrats (group b), responsible for implementing
economic reform;
7.  An urban group of students (group s);
8. An urban group of poor people (group u);
9. A rural group of rich farmers (group r), producing agricultural goods A.
In the model the impetus for economic reform is assumed to be exogenous; that is,
international financial institutions (like the [MF and the World Bank) place pressure on
the social structure to make policy changes. 6 Within the country a ruling elite (elected or
otherwise) decide if and when to pursue specific policy reform.  While they do not make
decisions on reform, urban politicians work with another social group -- government
bureaucrats - to help implement policy reform.  In the model ownership of industrial
capital is assumed to be concentrated in the hands of the state and a few urban capitalists;
the latter form a social group who typically have good access to urban politicians and the
ruling elite. Urban workers are assumed to be those who work in the private, modern
industrial sector. Urban workers are relatively well-paid, and may or may not be
organized into politically-powerful interest groups. 7 Two other social groups - urban
students and the urban poor  - are not usually organized into interest groups, but
members of these groups possess a type of "crypto-political" power by being able to
protest in the streets in order to delay economic reform.  In the model ownership of land
and agricultural capital is assumed to be concentrated in the hands of rich farmers; but
since members of this social group live outside the capital area their influence on policy
reform is less than other groups.6
From this outline, it follows that seven of the nine social groups use rent-seeking to
influence the process of economic reform. Of the seven groups which use rent-seeking,
four groups  - urban  capitalists,  urban  workers,  urban  poor and rich farmers  -- attempt  to
"buy" political influence in order to delay the pace of reform.  Three groups - ruling elite,
urban politicians and government bureaucrats - then "sell" their political influence in
order to expedite or impede reform.
Two groups, however, are not involved in rent-seeking activities.  International
financial institutions are assumed not to receive or pay rent; their activities are assumed to
focus more on a disinterested desire to initiate policy reform.  Similarly, urban students
are assumed not to be involved in rent-seeking, since they lack the economic resources to
pay or receive rent.
The mechanics of the policy reform process can be more formally elucidated by
considering the utility of each competing social group, both with and without rent-
seeking. Such an examination will help pinpoint the political and economic reasons why
different social groups chose to accept or oppose different types of policy reform.7
3. Group Utility without rent-seeking
With the exception of the international financial institutions, which are considered
to not receive any utility from policy reform, it can be assumed that each other social
group either gains or loses utility in the policy reform process.
Following Pedersen (1997), each social group of agents, i, derives utility from a
bundle of consumer goods bought in the market place, the aggregate of which is
symbolized by Vi, a group-specific public good, Fi, produced by the public sector and
supplied free of charge to group i, and a public good, G, produced by the public sector
and supplied free of charge to all members of society.  In the derivations below, the
groups of agents are assumed to have Cobb-Douglas utility functions:
U'  = (Vi)a i(Fi)131(G)ei  (1)
where  o&  + ,B + s6  = 1, and a' >  O, p'> O,  s' 2 O.
In addition, two social groups - ruling elite and urban politicians - are assumed to
derive utility from political longevity, L, measured as the number of years in office.
Political longevity is assumed to directly and positively influence the utility of the ruling
elite and urban politicians in some unspecified, multiplicative manner.  Thus, for the
ruling elite and urban politicians, the Cobb-Douglas utility function will be:
U' =  (Li) [(VI)ai(Fi)Oi(G)i  1  (2)
where  a' + ,Bi  +  ±  = 1, and a' > o,  r31 > O,  E' 2 O.
For all social groups, the indicator of the level of consumption goods bought in the
market place, Vi, is assumed to be a homothetic function of the consumption of
agricultural goods, the price of which is PA, and the consumption of industrial goods, with8
the price of pM. Letting e, (PA,  PM)  be a unit expenditure function (the price per unit of
consumption baskets), V' will equal V' = YV/e,(.),  where Y' is the amount spent on
consumer goods in the market place by agents in group i.  In order to simplify the
exposition, the unit expenditure function is assumed to be the same for all agents, no
matter which social group they belong to.
Disregarding rent-seeking costs (and benefits), the expenditures on consumer goods
for each social group must equal income after taxes and transfers:
Social group  Income
(without rent-seeking)
Ruling elite (group e)  ye  (L') [we-  T']
Urban politicians (group p)  yp = (Li) [WP + HP- TP]
Urban  capitalists (group k)  yk  =  PMM  - w -Tk
Urban  workers (group w)  Yw  = W` + Hw  - Tw
Urban  students (group s)  yS =Hs
Urban  poor (group u)  Yu= Wu  + Hu  -Tu
Government
bureaucrats (group b)  yb  =  Wb  - Tb
Rich farmers (group r)  Yr  =  PAA  + H' - T'  (3)
The formulations in equation (3) can be explained as follows. All agents (except
urban students) are assumed to pay taxes (T' > O)  to the government.  Five groups-
urban politicians, urban workers, urban students, the urban poor and rich farmers - are
assumed to receive transfers, H', from the government; these transfers, which may
possibly equal zero, include, for example, consumer subsidies. The ruling elite and urban
politicians are both treated as government employees, receiving wage income, Wi; this
wage income is multiplied by their political longevity in power (L i), which is unknown.9
Urban capitalists earn profits, pMM  -Ww,  and in this formulation the distribution of value
added in industry, pMM,  is assumed to be exogenously determined, for example, by the
country's terms of trade for manufactured goods. Like urban politicians, government
bureaucrats are treated as government employees, receiving wage income, Wi. However,
since government bureaucrats serve fixed terms of service, which are not dependent upon
political forces, their wages are not affected by considerations of political longevity, L'.
The income of rich farmers is assumed to be the value added in added in agriculture, pAA.
For all social groups, the economy is assumed to be small and open, so the prices for
agricultural and manufactured goods, PA and PM,  are exogenous, given by the world
market.
4a. Group Utility with rent-seeking: The Government
In the real world, not all social groups are equal.  With respect to economic policy
reform, only two groups - international financial institutions and the ruling elite - make
decisions about how and when to pursue policy reform. Two other groups - urban
politicians and government bureaucrats - are responsible for implementing policy reform.
Since in our model international financial institutions (like the IMF and World
Bank) are assumed to not receive any utility from policy reform, the other three political
and implementing groups - the ruling elite, urban politicians and government bureaucrats
-- can be considered as the "government."  In other words, it is these three groups who -
either through their direct decisions on policy reform or through their decisions about
how to implement reform - that decide "who gets what, when and how."10
4b.  Group Utility with rent-seeking: Rent-paying Groups
In the real world, four social groups -- urban capitalists, urban workers, the urban
poor and rich farmers - are engaged in a constant distribution struggle with the
government, with each group trying to maximize the amount of public goods that it
receives from the government.  This struggle necessarily involves each of these groups
with the political and implementing groups described above.
In an attempt to "buy" favorable decisions from the govermnent, the four social
groups engage in "rent-seeking."  (The fifth group, urban students, is assumed not to have
the economic resources to engage in "rent-seeking.)  That is, urban capitalists, urban
workers, the urban poor and rich farmers each pay rent or bribes, B, to buy the political
influence of the three groups which constitute the  "government."  In our case, it is
assumed that bribes are paid to two groups -- the ruling elite and urban politicians -- to
influence decisions regarding economic reform, and that bribes are paid to the third group
-- urban government bureaucrats -- to affect the implementation of these reform
decisions.
Since rent-seeking means income transfers from the four competing
groups (e,Bk, evBw,  evBu, and e,Br) to the ruling elite, urban politicians and government
bureaucrats, with rent-seeking the income of the various social groups may be
expressed as:11
Social group  Income
(with rent-seeking)
Ruling elite (group e)  Ye = (Li) [We  - Te]  + ev(Bk  + Bw + Bu
+ Br)
Urban politicians (group p)  Yp  = (L 1) [Wp  + HP-  TP]  + ev(Bk  + Bw + Bu
+ B)
Urban capitalists (group k)  yk  =  pM  - w-  Tk  evBk
Urban  workers  (group  w)  Yw=  w  + Hw-  Tw-  evBw
Urban  students  (group  s)  y  S  = Hs
Urban  poor  (group  u)  Y'=  Wu + HU- Tu - evBU
Government
bureaucrats (group b)  Yb  =  Wb  - Tb + ev(Bk  + BW + BU
+ Br)
Rich  farmers  (group r)  YT  = PA  + H  - Tr  - evBr
(4)
This formulation means that rent-seeking is measured in terms of units of consumption
baskets, the price of each is ev.
From the standpoint of the four groups that pay rent - urban capitalists, urban
workers, the urban poor and rich farmers  -- the problem is to decide how much rent to
pay to each of the three groups that constitute the "government."  In other words, how
much rent should be paid to the ruling elite and urban politicians to support (or block) the
decision to pursue reform, and how much rent should be paid to government bureaucrats
to support (or block) the implementation of reform?  In order to simplify the exposition, it
is assumed that each group pays the same amount of rent to each group in the
"government."12
5.  Political Weight of Competing Groups
Not only do social groups differ on the basis of whether they receive or pay rent,
but these groups have different political power or weight in the process of policy reform.
More specifically, it can be assumed that social groups have different political weights on
the basis of their physical and/or social "distance" from the two key groups that make
decisions about policy reform: international financial institutions and the ruling elite. In
other words, social groups which are physically close to - and/or frequently socially
interact with - international financial institutions and the ruling elite are assumed to have
more political input into the policy reform process.  This means that two groups -- urban
politicians and urban capitalists - have relatively more political weight in the reform
process.  By contrast, those groups which are physically or socially removed from
international political institutions and the ruling elite have less weight in the reform
process.  This means that the urban poor - who have little physical or social contact with
decision makers - and rich farmers - who are physically removed (in rural areas) from
decision makers - have less input into the reform process.
Assuming that international financial institutions and the ruling elite each have a
maximum political weight of 10, it is possible to assign weights to the other social groups
as follows:13
Social group  Political Power or
Weight in Reform
International financial  10
Institutions (group i)
Ruling elite (group e)  10
Urban politicians (group p)  9
Urban capitalists (group k)  8
Urban workers (group w)  7
Urban government  7
Bureaucrats (group b)
Urban students (group s)  6
Urban poor (group u)  5
Rich farmers (group r)  4  (5)
It is possible to explain the political weights in equation (5) as follows.  Since they
are located in urban areas and interact frequently with the ruling elite, urban politicians
have a political weight of 9.  For similar reasons, urban capitalists are assigned a weight
of 8. Because they can organize into potentially powerful interest groups, and thus can
protest for or against policy reform, urban workers have a weight of 7. Urban
government bureaucrats, who are responsible for implementing (but not deciding on)
reform policies, also have a political weight of 7. As noted above, urban students and the
poor, although they lack physical and social contact with decision makers, possess a type
of "crypto-political" power because they can "take to the streets" to delay economic
reform. Urban students, who tend to be better organized, are thus assigned a political
weight of 6, and the urban poor a weight of 5.  Rich farmers, both because they are
physically removed from decision makers and because they generally do not "take to the
streets" to protest, have a weight of 4.14
6.  Decision Calculus of Politicians for Reform
At this point, one critical question needs to be addressed, namely:  Why would the
ruling elite choose to pursue policy reformn  in the first place?  That is to say, since the
ruling elite will receive rents with or without economic reform, what is the incentive for
them to undertake reform in the first place?
Economic reform is typically pursued when international financial institutions
convince one key political group - the ruling elite - that their political longevity depends
on pursuing reform.  The emphasis here is on the self-interests of the ruling elite:  that is,
outside organizations (like the IMF and World Bank) need to convince the ruling elite
that without economic reform the latter's hold on power will be either fatally weakened
or will shortly end.  From this perspective, it is not the disinterested concern of the ruling
elite for improving the life of the masses that leads to reforn,  but the cold-hearted
concern of the elite for their own survival that prompts action.
Two inter-locking reasons for this decision calculus can be cited.  The first is self-
interest.  Following Hobbes and other social theorists, it can be assumed that social
groups - including the ruling elite - are motivated primarily by self-interest.  The second
reason has been cited in the economic literature on reform;  namely, the notion of
uncertainty. Since the ruling elite of any country are uncertain about the benefits that
either they or the members of their society will enjoy if a particular reform is adopted, the
first principle  -- self-interest  -- becomes  the determining  factor.  For example,  if the
ruling elite become convinced that their tenure in office will be threatened by not15
pursuing currency devaluation, then they will by all means choose to devalue.  In this
example, the perceived utility of receiving rents and income in the future outweighs the
disutility that might come about from being thrown out of office (either by election or
other means).
One basic reason why the ruling elite are uncertain about the benefits of reform has
to do with intersectoral factor mobility. This denotes the ability of different factors of
production - land, labor and capital --  to move between various sectors of the economy,
such as the import and export sectors.  In most countries the ruling elite tend to be
uncertain about the net benefits of economic reform because they simply don't know how
mobile land, labor and capital are in the economy. For instance, if the ruling elite decide
to privatize state-owned firms, this is likely to increase unemployment in the short-term.
For this reason, privatization is likely to be resisted by urban workers.  However, if in the
long-term, labor can move between different sectors of the economy - in this case,
between the urban public and private sectors --- privatization of state firms might not
necessarily lead to large unemployment.  If unemployed state workers are able to find
jobs in newly established private firms, the long-run consequences of privatization may
not be so deleterious.
With regards to time orientation, it should be emphasized that the decision-making
calculus of the ruling elite is typically fixed more on the short-term than on the long-term.
Stated more baldly, political longevity in office often consists more of taking a series of
short-term decisions that are not likely to offend important political groups rather than16
taking one long-term decision designed to improve the material lot of a wider variety of
groups.
7a.  Applying the Model to Specific Types of Policy Reform
It now becomes useful to apply the model to specific types of policy reform.  One
important part of this "practical" application of the model is to specify how a particular
reform will affect the utility of differently-weighted social groups.  Groups which benefit
from a particular reform are likely to favor that reform, while groups which do not benefit
are likely to oppose that initiative.  Summing up the net political weights of "advantaged"
and "disadvantaged" groups will show whether a particular policy reform is likely to be
adopted or opposed.
As noted above, policy reform in the model is considered to be exogeneous, that is,
reform is initiated by international financial institutions.  These institutions are therefore
assumed to support all types of policy reform.
For similar reasons, in most cases, the ruling elite is also assumed to be in favor of
policy reform. In the model, reform is only initiated when the international financial
institutions convince the ruling elite that their political longevity depends on adopting and
pursuing reform.
With these assumptions in place, the first type of policy reform to be considered is
currency devaluation.
7b.  Currency Devaluation17
By raising the price of tradable goods (exports and imports) relative to non-traded
goods (e.g. construction), a policy reform like currency devaluation can help correct a
balance of payments deficit. For this reason, international financial institutions, which
are anxious for countries to reduce their external deficits, are often strong proponents of
currency devaluation (Table 1).
Once they are convinced of the need to devalue, the ruling elite are also likely to
favor devaluation, because such a move is likely to improve their country's external
deficits by stimulating exports and (hopefully) raising general economic activity.  This, in
turn, will increase the political longevity (L') of the ruling elite and their ability to collect
rents (ev(Bk  + BW  + BU  + B').
The position of other social groups is less clear. In the short-run, if factors of
production are relatively immobile, then owners of  those factors of production which
produce for the international market are likely to benefit.  According to Table 1, rich
farmers (producing export crops) and urban capitalists (producing export goods) will
likely favor devaluation because their value added in agriculture (pAA)  and in industry
(pMM)  will increase.  However, as shown in the table, if it is difficult to move land and
capital between the traded and non-traded sector, rich farmers and urban capitalists who
are not producing for the export market are likely to be harmed by devaluation.  For
example, since many rich farmers in Zimbabwe grow maize for the domestic market, it is
not clear whether large farmers in this country would benefit from devaluation (Skalnes,
1989). Similarly, since the banking and credit systems in Ghana are in such disrepair, it
is unclear whether urban capitalists were able to take advantage of the export18
opportunities presented by large devaluations in that country in the 1980s (Herbst, 1993).8
For these reasons, the net effects of devaluation on rich farmers and urban capitalists are
mixed, and some members of these two groups will support devaluation and others will
oppose it.
Table 1 shows that devaluation is likely to have a wholly negative effect on one
group - urban government bureaucrats - and a partly negative effect on another group --
urban politicians.  In many developing countries, devaluation often replaces the
administrative rationing of foreign exchange. This rationing has some of the same effects
as a tariff that expands domestic production of the imported good (usually capital-
intensive) and decreases production of the exported good (usually labor-intensive). By
removing this tariff, devaluation has the effect of raising the price of imported goods, and
reducing the price of exported goods. Urban govermment  bureaucrats and politicians are
thus harmed in two ways. First, to the extent that they have a high propensity to consume
imported goods, their ability to buy these imported goods -- and thus their real wage
income (W' and WP)  - will fall. Second, to the extent that urban bureaucrats and
politicians "control" the administrative rationing of foreign exchange, their ability to
derive "rents" ev(Bk  + BW  + Bu + B1)  from these controls will decline with devaluation. 9
Currency devaluation will thus have a doubly deleterious impact upon the income of
government bureaucrats, and this group will likely oppose devaluation.
However, the position of urban politicians is more mixed, because in certain
situations currency devaluation will actually extend the political longevity (LP)  of urban
politicians.  In other words, in the short-run, the income of urban politicians may fall, but19
in the long-term - by staying in office - their income is likely to rise.  Some urban
politicians will thus support devaluation, and others will oppose this reform.
According to Table 1, the position of the final three social groups -- urban workers,
urban students and the urban poor -- on devaluation will probably be uncertain.
On the one hand, urban labor is likely to benefit from a devaluation that replaces
administrative controls and raises the relative price of labor-intensive manufactures vis-a-
vis more capital-intensive sectors. Because of factor mobility, in theory, urban workers
should be able to move between sectors as outputs (and income) grow in the labor-
intensive export sector, and shrink in the more capital-intensive sectors.  However, in
both the short- and medium-term, these processes may lead to more unemployment,
especially when the export sector does not expand as expected and/or imported
intermediate goods are important in production.  Moreover, while in theory labor may be
freely mobile between sectors, in reality many developing countries have employment
policies which act as obstacles to the smooth movement of labor between sectors.  For
example, in Chile the policy of wage indexation coupled with the suspension of labor
laws so inhibited the mobility of labor that after a large devaluation in 1982 effective
unemployment peaked at 31 percent in 1983, and did not fall below 20 percent until 1986
(Meller, 1991: Table 9; Toye, 1995). Thus, for urban labor as a whole, weighing out the
possible net gains from higher incomes versus increased unemployment is difficult, and
urban workers are consequently likely to adopt an uncertain position on currency
devaluation.20
For similar reasons, urban students and the urban poor are also likely to adopt an
uncertain, wait-and-see position on currency devaluation. Urban students are not selling
their labor, and so the issue of intersectoral labor mobility does not affect them.
Furthermore, it is difficult to know how devaluation will affect the transfers (HS)  going to
students.  Likewise for the urban poor: since most of the members of this social group
work in the informal sector, it is unclear how currency devaluation will affect either their
wage income (WU)  or the transfers (HU)  that they receive.
If Yu  represents aggregate private sector income for the eight social groups
(excluding the international financial institutions), then the net distributional effects of
currency devaluation can be summarized as:
YU = (LeT+  Wet + ev(Bkt + BWt  + BUt + Brt)
+ (LPt  + WPTN + ev'Bkt  + BWU  ±  BUN  + BWU)
±  (PMMf N + evBk4,)  + (Ww? +  evBw4z)
+ [Wb4, + ev(Bk4,  + Bw; + BUJ + Br4)] + (Hs?)
+ (WU?  + Hu?  + evB4)  + (pAAtUJ  +  evBi-)  (6)
where for the ruling elite, political longevity, real wages and rents received will increase;
for urban politicians, political longevity will increase but real wages may/may not
increase and rents received will increase/decrease; for urban capitalists, value added in
industry may/may not increase but rents paid out will fall; for urban workers, the net level
of real wages is uncertain, but rents paid out will fall; for urban government bureaucrats,
both real wages and rents received will decline; for urban students, the level of transfers21
received is uncertain; for the urban poor, the level of real wages and transfers is uncertain
but rents paid out will fall; and for rich farmers, valued added in agriculture may/may not
increase, but rents paid out will decrease.
Summing up the political power points of the social groups for and against reform,
Table 1 suggests that currency devaluation is a policy reform that is likely to be
implemented. While there are 30.5 political power points in favor of devaluation, only
17.5 power points are against devaluation. Of key importance here is the large number of
"uncertain" power points:  18. As explained above, the position of three social groups -
urban workers, urban students and the urban poor - vis-a-vis currency devaluation is
unclear.
These findings suggest that currency devaluation is a policy reform that is likely to
be implemented because it generates more political support than opposition from social
groups. Moreover, currency devaluation is a reform that is relatively easy to implement.
In fact, as Gordon (1996: 1528) argues, devaluation is "essentially self-implementing."'"
Once technical experts (typically the IMF) and the ruling elite have agreed on the
technical aspects - for example, how much to devalue, whether to adopt an adjustable or
crawling peg, what basket of currencies, if any, to peg to - all that is required is for the
ruling elite to instruct government bureaucrats to implement that new exchange rate." 1
From a political standpoint, therefore, it is difficult for social groups to resist currency
devaluation. Moreover, those groups which are most opposed to devaluation -- for
example, urban government bureaucrats -- are not likely to "take to the streets" to
demonstrate against this move.22
All of this accords with practice in the real world.  In a recent review of economic
policy reforms in 40 developing countries, the World Bank (1988:  Table 3.1) found that
38 of the 40 countries successfully went through some type of currency devaluation.
Currency devaluation is relatively easy to implement, because social groups with large
political weight tend to support this reform.
7c. Privatizing State Companies
During the 1950s and 1960s many developing countries adopted import
substitution policies which were designed to spur domestic industrial growth.  These
import substitution policies were often coupled with socialistic policies whereby
"leading" domestic industries -such  as those in chemicals, steel, fertilizers and yarn -
were placed under state ownership and control.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the international financial institutions began urging
countries to privatize the very industries that had been nationalized in earlier years.  The
goal of these privatization efforts was twofold: one, to reduce the large deficits that many
of these state-owned enterprises were beginning to accumulate; and two, to stirnulate
private sector development in order to attract private capital, accelerate economic growth
and create jobs.
As Table 2 suggests, international financial institutions are likely to be prime
supporters of efforts to privatize state companies. However, the position of other social
groups is likely to be less positive.23
In many countries state-owned, and protected, enterprises represent an important
vehicle through which two key groups - the ruling elite and urban politicians -- can
redistribute wealth and build political support. By overmanning state-owned firms and
by setting the wage rates at these enterprises higher than those in the private sector, the
ruling elite and urban politicians can reward supporters and punish opponents.
For these reasons, Table 2 shows that the ruling elite and urban politicians are
likely to partly support - and partly oppose - privatization. The key issue here concerns
long-term gains versus short-term costs.  In the long term, privatizing inefficient, state-
owned enterprises may help attract private capital and increase economic growth, thereby
extending the political longevity (L) of the ruling elite and urban politicians.  In the short
term, however, with privatization, these two social groups will no longer be able to offer
safe employment sinecures and higher public wages to their supporters. This in turn will
reduce the short-term "rents" ev(Bk  + Bw  + BU  + Br) that the ruling elite and urban
politicians will be able to collect.
Urban government bureaucrats are likely to oppose privatization more strongly
than the two preceding groups. Urban government bureaucrats are not concerned with
the increased political longevity that privatization might bring; furthermore, privatization
is likely to reduce the "rents" ev(Bk  + Bw  + Bu + BD)  that government bureaucrats are able
to collect, without offering them any compensating increase in wages. Writing about
privatization efforts in Ghana and Zambia, Martin notes:24
Politicians and civil servants were the most powerful group in both countries.
They resisted or delayed (privatization) not only because they believed that
it would not work, but also because the reforms damaged their interests by reducing
their living standards, bringing layoffs, depriving them of "rents" from existing
policies. . This applied especially to (privatization) reforms in major
parastatals...  .(Martin,  1993: 139)
Urban workers and the urban poor are also likely to strongly oppose privatization.
Privatization is likely to increase unemployment and cause real wage rates (W) for both
groups to decline.  This will be particularly true in countries which do not have enough
formal and informal sector jobs to absorb large numbers of dismissed public sector
employees.  In Africa, for example, public sector employees represent 54 percent of all
non-agricultural employees (Heller and Tait, 1983: 45).12 While in the long-term labor
may be able to move between sectors, the relative absence of employment opportunities
in the private sector in Africa - and elsewhere - means that urban workers and the urban
poor will generally resist demands to privatize.
Urban students are also likely to oppose privatization.  Since in many countries a
large proportion of university graduates typically seek public sector employment,
privatizing state companies is likely to reduce the future  job opportunities (and wage-
earning possibilities) of urban students.  This social group is thus likely to resist
privatization.
According to Table 2, only one social group - urban capitalists - is likely to
benefit from, and thus favor, privatization.  Urban capitalists are likely to gain from
privatization because as company payrolls decrease,  their value added in industry (pMM)
will rise.  Urban capitalists are also likely to benefit from the second- and third-round25
effects of privatization, because any increase in the number of unemployed is likely to put
downward pressures on the real wages paid to workers (W').
The position of the final social group -- rich farners  -- vis-a-vis privatization is
uncertain. On the one hand, the demise of inefficient, state-owned enterprises will
probably reduce the prices (and increase the quality) of those goods produced by local
firms.  This will, of course, benefit rich farmers. However, to the extent that these
wealthy rural residents look to public firms and enterprises as safe sources of
employment for their offspring, the move towards privatization might be unsettling.
If YU  represents aggregate private sector income for the eight social groups
(excluding the international financial institutions), then the net distributional effects of
privatization can be summarized as:
Yu = (Let+ Wet + ev(BkTl  + Bwt4-+  BUt4 + BrU)
+ (LPT + WPt  + ev(Bkt4  + Bwt;  + BUll  + Brt4)
•  (pMMt  +  Ww 1- + evBk4)  + (w4  +  eBw4)
+  [W"4 + ev(Bk4,  + BwI + B"4  + BrJ)]  +  (future  WS4,)
+  (W"4.+  Hu?  + evBI4) + (pAA?  + Hr? - ev  Br4)  (7)
where for the ruling elite, political longevity and real wages will increase but rents
received may/may not increase; for urban politicians, political longevity and real wages
will increase but rents received will increase/decrease; for urban capitalists, value added
in industry will increase and real wages and rents paid out will fall; for urban workers,
real wages and rents paid out will fall; for urban government bureaucrats, both real wages26
and rents received will decline; for urban students, the level of future wages will fall; for
the urban poor, the level of real wages and rents paid out will fall; and for rich farmers,
the level of valued added in agriculture is uncertain, but rents paid out will decrease.
Summing up the political power points of the social groups for and against reform,
Table 2 suggests that privatization is a policy reform that will be very difficult to
implement. While there are 27.5 political power points in favor of privatization, there are
34.5 power points against privatization and 4.0 points are "uncertain".  In other words,
there are more power points - and groups - opposing privatization, than there are
favoring this particular reform. Privatization is thus a policy reform that is likely to be
delayed and/or not imnplemented,  because of the array of social groups opposing it.
Writing about efforts to privatize in Africa, Herbst observes:
. . here is no defined constituency that is demanding (privatization) because
improved public sector management would probably mean trimming the work-
force in an attempt to make parastatals more efficient, and reducing the largesse
that is now distributed quite widely. The (privatization) of state-owned
corporations might benefit a few individuals, but it is unlikely to bring significant
economic benefits to many...  .(Herbst, 1989: 81).
In light of the above, it is not surprising that a recent IMF study of economic
reforms in 19 countries found that "public enterprise reform in most countries is far from
complete. In general, these countries need further divestiture and liquidation (of public
enterprises)...  ." (IMF, 1993: 14). Privatization of public firms remains incomplete in
many developing countries because social groups with significant political weight firmly
oppose this particular policy reform.27
7d. Eliminating  Consumer  (Food)  Subsidies
In many developing  countries  consumer  (food)  subsidy  programs  often place  a
large burden on the public  budget  and  make a sizeable  contribution  to government  budget
deficits. Moreover,  these subsidy  programs  are  often not economically  efficient  because
their benefits sometimes  do not reach those  in greatest  need, that is, the poor. Because  of
improper  targeting,  a large  part of consumer  subsidies  is often "leaked"  to high-income
people.
For these and other reasons,  international  financial  institutions  are likely  to be
strong  proponents  of efforts  to eliminate  consumer  subsidy  programs  (Table 3).  Once
they are convinced  of the need  to eliminate  subsidy  programs,  the ruling elite are also
likely  to favor  this policy  reform. By eliminating  consumer  subsidies,  the ruling elite  will
be better able  to balance  the government  budget,  and thus to (hopefully)  qualify  for more
external  loans  and assistance. This in turn will extend  the ruling elite's political longevity
(LC)  and their ability to collect rents ev(Bk  + BW  + Bu + Br).
For many of the same  reasons,  urban  politicians  will also favor  eliminating
consumer  subsidies. Since  the transfers  (HP)  that they  receive  from these subsidies
represent  only a small proportion  of their incomes,  urban  politicians  will be more
concerned  with eliminating  subsidies  in order  to extend  their political  longevity  and their
ability to collect  rents.
By contrast,  urban  capitalists  are likely  to partly favor  and  partly oppose  the
elimination  of consumer  subsidies. On the one hand,  with the elimination  of costly
subsidy  programs,  it is conceivable  that the tax burden (Tk)  of urban capitalists  will fall.28
However, consumer subsidies have enabled many developing country governments to
engage in wage repression; that is, by providing in-kind consumer subsidies, governments
are able to keep real wages lower than otherwise would have been the case. To the extent
that the elimination of consumer subsidies puts an upward pressure on real wage rates
(WW),  urban capitalists may oppose the elimination of consumer subsidies.
In the countryside, rich farmers will also partly favor and partly oppose the
elimination of consumer subsidies. If the government imports food, and sells it at a
subsidized price, the elimination of food subsidies will increase the prices received by
those farmers who grow that food.  To the extent that rich farmers grow food crops, the
elimination of food subsidies will increase their value added in agriculture (pAA).
However, if the government also subsidizes other production inputs into agriculture-
such as fertilizer, water - the situation becomes more ambiguous. If the government
eliminates all subsidies - food and agricultural - then the net effects of this reform on
rich farmers are unclear, and will differ in different countries.
The social group that is responsible for administering consumer subsidies - urban
government bureaucrats - is likely to oppose the elimination of these subsidies.  The
reason for this is simple: leakage. No matter how well designed, consumer subsidy
programs "leak" a certain percentage of their benefits (e.g. subsidized food, fertilizer) to
the non-poor. In many cases, government bureaucrats, who are charged with
implementing subsidy programs, can take steps to ensure that they receive a good
percentage of these leaks. For example, in Bangladesh government bureaucrats have
been able to "cut deals" with private rice mill owners in order to share a portion of the29
subsidized rice that was intended for the poor (Adams, 1998). Thus, with the elimination
of consumer subsidies, the real income of urban government bureaucrats is likely to fall
because the "rents" ev(Bk  + Bw  + Bu + B')  they receive from administering these subsidy
programs will disappear.
The social group which is the main intended recipient of consumer subsidies - the
urban poor -- will also oppose the elimination of these subsidies.  In many countries the
food and other subsidized commodities that the urban poor receive account for 10 to 20
percent of their total consumption expenditures." 3 Any cutback in subsidies will therefore
not only reduce the poor's transfers (Hu),  but it will also force them to spend more on
consumption, thus causing their real wages (W") to decline.
Since consumer subsidy programs are usually not well targeted, these programs
also tend to benefit "unintended" groups, like urban workers and urban students.  For
example, both workers and students benefit from the large, untargeted subsidy on bread
in Egypt (Ali and Adams, 1996). Thus, any cutback in subsidies will also force members
of these groups to spend more on consumption, and (in the case of urban workers) cause
their real wages (income) to fall.
In many countries the opposition of the urban poor and urban students to cutbacks
in consumer subsidies can lead to widespread social unrest.  As noted above, members of
these two groups possess a type of  "crypto-political" power to take their concerns to the
street.  In fact, members of these groups have led street protests against consumer subsidy
cutbacks in a wide variety of developing countries:  Jordan (1996), Zimbabwe (1993),
Zambia (1986), Sudan (1985), Morocco (1984, 1981), the Dominican Republic (1984)30
and Tunisia  (1984). Oftentimes,  the threat  of such street  protests  can make the ruling
elite  of a country  think twice about eliminating  consumer  subsidy  programs.
If yu represents  aggregate  private sector  income for the eight social groups
(excluding  the international  financial  institutions),  then the net distributional  effects  of
eliminating  consumer  subsidies  can be summarized  as:
yu  = (Let+  Wet  + e,(Bkt  + Bwt+  But  + Brt)
+ (LPt  + WPt  + e v(Bkt  + Bwt  + But  + Brt)
+  (Ww  t  + Tk  + evBk4) + (Wl  + Hw  4-evBw.k)
+  [ev(Bk.  +  Bw4  +  BU4 +  BrJ)]  +  }S4)
+  (H4  N +  W%  L)  +  (pAAT4-  + I-  e,B  4B)  (8)
where  for the ruling elite,  political  longevity,  real wages and rents received  will all
increase;  for urban  politicians,  political  longevity,  real wages  and rents received  will all
rise;  for urban capitalists,  real  wages  paid to workers  will rise, but taxes and rents paid
out will fall; for urban  workers,  real wages,  transfers  received  and rents paid out will all
decline;  for urban  government  bureaucrats,  rents received  will fall; for urban students,
transfers  received  will fall; for the urban  poor, transfers  received  and real wages  will fall;
and for rich farmers,  valued  added  in agriculture  may/may  not increase,  but transfers
received  and  rents  paid  out  will  decrease.
Summing  up the political  power  points of the social groups  for and against  reform,
Table  3 suggests  that eliminating  consumer  subsidies  is a policy reform  that will be
difficult - but not impossible - to implement.  While there are 33 political power points31
in favor of eliminating consumer subsidies, there are 31 power points opposing this
reform and 2 power points which are "uncertain." In other words, this is a policy reform
that will need to be implemented with the slimnmest  of political margins. With the right
kind of demonstrated concern for the interests of opposing social groups, it should be
politically possible to reduce and/or eliminate consumer subsidy programs.
These findings parallel those of the real world.  In those countries where
international financial institutions (like the IMF and the World Bank) have been able to
convince the ruling elite to eliminate consumer subsidies, these subsidies have typically
been reduced by following three basic principles. Each of these principles, it should be
emphasized, tries to minimize the opposition of the social groups noted in Table 3.
First, to avoid the type of street unrest that can be caused by sudden subsidy
cutbacks, several countries have reduced consumer subsidies on a slow and gradual basis.
For instance, Bangladesh (1984-90), Tunisia (1984-93) and Egypt (1985-95) all reduced
consumer subsidies by gradually reducing the number and size of subsidized
commodities over a period of years. 14 Second, these gradual reforms have typically been
pursued in a phased and staggered manner.  In Zambia, for example, the general subsidy
on maize was replaced in 1989 by a coupon system, and in 1990 this coupon system was
made available only for the poor (Pearce, 1990). Third, reductions in consumer subsidy
programs have often been coupled with compensatory measures. For instance, as food
subsidies were reduced in Tunisia, minimum wages were raised to placate urban workers,
and aid to school cafeterias was increased to appease students (Tuck and Lindert, 1996:
31).1532
8.  Conclusion
While some attempts at economic policy reform are adopted and pursued in the
developing world, other attempts at reform are delayed and resisted. As this paper has
demonstrated, the reason for this is politics.  By its very nature, economic reform is an
inherently political act:  because it changes the distribution of benefits in society,
economic reform benefits some social groups and harms others.  In certain situations, as
the economic literature has argued, social groups may oppose reform because they are
uncertain about its possible benefits (Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Rodrik, 1996, 1993).
However, as this paper has demonstrated, in many other instances social groups oppose
reform because they are well-aware of how reform will harm their economic interests.
This paper has shown how three specific types of economic reforn  - currency
devaluation, privatization of state-owned companies, and elimination of consumer (food)
subsidies - affect the utility of eight different social groups (excluding international
financial institutions). According to the analysis, the key to understanding how each of
these policy reforms will be implemented and/or opposed is to identify the impact of each
reform on the political power or weight of "advantaged" and "disadvantaged" social
groups.  For example, when governments try to privatize state-owned enterprises, more
social groups with greater political weight are likely to be disadvantaged than
advantaged. Specifically, when governments try to privatize, four social groups - urban
workers, urban government bureaucrats, urban students and the urban poor - are likely to
"lose out" and thus will strongly oppose this particular reform. Moreover, two other
groups - the ruling elite and urban politicians - are also likely to at least partly resist33
privatization because they fear that this reforn  will reduce the "rents" that they receive.
With more social groups - and more power points - arrayed against privatization than
favoring this reform, privatization is a policy reform that is likely to be delayed and/or
not implemented at all.
However, it would be erroneous to conclude that social groups can successfully
resist all types of economic reform. Rather this paper emphasizes that social groups do
not possess an absolute veto over the whole economic reform process.  Contrary to the
pessimism that neoclassical political economy analysis sometimes suggests for the
prospects of economic reform,' 6 this paper shows that policy reform can - and often does
-occur  despite the opposition of certain social groups. The key here is to understand
which social groups oppose reform and how much political weight these opposing groups
have in the policy reform process.  Consider, for instance, the case of eliminating
consumer (food) subsidies. As this paper has shown, a total of six social groups either
partly or wholly oppose eliminating consumer subsidies. However, the combined
political weight of these six opposing groups is only roughly equal to the political weight
of the four social groups - international financial institutions, the ruling elite, urban
politicians and urban capitalists - which favor this reforn.  In other words, from a
political standpoint, eliminating consumer subsidies is a policy reform that can be
achieved. With the right kind of concern for the interests of opposing social groups, it
should be possible to reduce and/or eliminate consumer subsidy programs in many
developing countries.34
Notes
1. In this paper economnic  reform refers to two broad types of policies: stabilization and structural
adjustment. While stabilization policies aim at controlling inflation and improving the balance of
payments, structural adjustment policies stress reducing trade barriers, enlarging the role of the private
sector, and changing a country's development strategy from import-substitution to one of export-
promotion.
2.  For similar perspectives on the political nature of economic reform, see Killick (1995), Herbst (1990)
and Bienen and Gersovitz (1985).
3.  For example, Alesina and Drazen (1991) assume two contending social groups (capital and labor), as
do Laban and Sturzenegger (1994).
4.  For useful country case studies of the political economy of economic reform, see Radelet (1992) on
Gambia, Hawkins (1991) on Zambia, Haggard (1990) on the Philippines and Herbst (1989) on Zimbabwe.
5.  Two possible exceptions to this statement are Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1991: Table 4.7), who
briefly examnine  the effect of economic reform on different occupational groups in the developing world,
and de Janvry et al (1994), who use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to examine the effect
of reform on interest groups in one particular country:  Ecuador.
6.  Writing about the process of economic reformn  in Sub-Saharan Africa, Gulhati states:  "By and large,
the initiative on policy (reform) has been taken not by leaders and bureaucrats, but by international
organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. The (national) economic agencies have not exhibited
a capacity to undertake policy work; instead they have adopted the posture of reacting to policy
proposals designed abroad" (Gulhati, 1988: 14).
7.  In many developing countries, social groups may exist, but whether or not these social groups can
develop into politically-powerful interest groups is often unclear. For example, Grindle writes: 1.1..
organized interest-group activity tends to be less clearly defined in developing countries than in the35
industrialized West. Large portions of the population - peasants and urban shanty-town residents, for
instance - are generally not organized for sustained political activity....  Additionally, many
authoritarian regimes in the Third World actively discourage representation of social interests through
formally organized interest grOUpS.  "Interests" clearly exist in developing countries, but the extent to
which they are or can be formally constituted.  .must always be identified empirically" (Grindle, 1991:
52).
8.  Evaluations of economic reform in other developing countries have found that the supply response to
devaluation is often inhibited because the banking system is unable to supply the quantities of credit
needed by urban firms as working capital.  See, for example, Taylor (1988).
9.  On this point, Bienen writes ". . .the whole panoply of import controls has increased corruption in
Africa.  Those who have benefited most have been public-sector officials with the power to control
licenses, quotas and access to foreign exchange" (Bienen, 1990: 726).
10. Similarly, Killick (1993: 174) notes that currency devaluation is a "relatively simple (policy
instrument) to administer" and "it can be executed within existing institutions."
11. From the standpoint of urban politicians, there is some -admittedly  old -- empirical data which
suggest that currency devaluations are risky to those in power.  In seven out of 24 countries which
devalued in the 1960s, Cooper (1971) found that the government fell from power within a year of
devaluing. This rate was about twice as high as would have otherwise been predicted.
12. In Asia public sector employees represent 36 percent of all non-agricultural employees, while in Latin
America the corresponding figure is 27 percent (Heller and Tait, 1983: 45).
13. For example, subsidized food from the food subsidy system in Egypt accounts for 20.7 percent of the
total consumption expenditures of those households in the lowest expenditure quintile group.  See Adams
(forthcoming).
14. For information on Bangladesh, see Adams (1998); for Tunisia, see Tuck and Lindert (1996)
and for Egypt, see Ali and Adams (1996).
15. Likewise, in 1978 when Sri Lanka reduced by half the number of people eligible for its food subsidy36
program,  it also announced  a wage  increase  of 25 percent to all wage  earners  who were no longer  eligible
for subsidized  food (Pieris,  1992: 34).
16. For more  on this  point, see Grindle  (1991: 58-67).37
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Table 1 - Social Group Reaction to Currency Devaluation
Political  Political Power Points:
Power or  Group Reaction to Reform  Favoring  Opposing
Social Group  Weight in  Reform  Reform  Uncertain
Reform
(1) International financial  10  Favor  10
institutions (i)
(2) Ruling elite (e)  10  Favor [Let,Wet,e,(Bkt  + BWt  + But +  10
Brt)]
(3) Urban politicians (p)  9  Favor  [LPt,WPUt4',e,(Bk"N  +  4.5  4.5
Oppose  BWl  + WU  + Brt4<)]
(4) Urban capitalists (k)  8  Favor  [pMMU, e  4  4
oppose
(5) Urban workers (w)  7  Uncertain  (W w  ?,e v Bw'1)  7
(6) Urban government  7  Oppose  [W bt,e  v(Bk4,  + Bwli +  7
bureaucrats (b)  Bu4z  + B r)]
(7) Urban students (s)  6  Uncertain  (H S?)  6
(8) Urban poor (u)  5  Uncertain  (W u?,HU?,e  Bu4,)  5
(9) Rich farmers (r)  4  Favor  (pAU,  e  vB  2  2
Oppose  }  (At-e~4
Total  66  30.5  17.5  18
Notes:  A = Value added in agriculture
B = Rents or Bribes
H = Transfers
L =  Political longevity (years)
M = Value added in manufacturing
T = Taxes
W = Wages (real)
p=  Profits43
Table 2 - Social Group Reaction to Privatizing State Companies
Political  Political Power Points:
Power or  Group Reaction to Reform  Favoring  Opposing
Social Group  Weight in  Reform  Reform  Uncertain
Reform
(1) International financial  10  Favor  10
institutions (i)
(2) Ruling elite (e)  10  Favor  [Let,WeT,e,(Bkt4, + Bwt  5  5
Oppose  + BUl'N.  + BrWtU)]
(3) Urban  politicians (p)  9  Favor  [L PT,WPlT,e (BklTKI+  Bwt4  4.5  4.5
Oppose  + BUt.2  + Brt4)]
(4) Urban capitalists (k)  8  Favor  (pmMT,WW  i,ev  BkJ)  8
(5) Urban workers (w)  7  Oppose  (Ww I,e v  BWN)  7
(6) Urban  government  7  Oppose  [W b?,e v(Bk4.  + BW4.  +  7
bureaucrats (b)  Bu4 + B rT)]
(7) Urban students (s)  6  Oppose  (future WS`>)  6
(8) Urban poor (u)  5  Oppose  (W u4.,HU?,e  BU4)  5
(9) Rich farmers (r)  4  Uncertain  (pAA?,e Bi.)  4
Total  66  27.5  34.5  4
Notes:  A = Value added in agriculture
B = Rents or Bribes
H = Transfers
L =  Politic'al longevity (years)
M = Value added in manufacturing
T =  Taxes
W = Wages (real)
p =  Profits44
Table 3 - Social Group Reaction to Eliminating Consumer (Food) Subsidies
Political  Political Power Points:
Power or  Group Reaction to Reform  Favoring  Opposing
Social Group  Weight in  Reform  Reform  Uncertain
Reform
(1) International financial  10  Favor  10
institutions (i)
(2) Ruling elite (e)  10  Favor  [Let,WeT,e,(Bkt  + BWT  + BUT  +  10
Brt)]
(3) Urban politicians (p)  9  Favor [LPt,WPt,e  ,(Bkt + BWT  + But +  9
Brt)]
(4) Urban capitalists (k)  8  Favor  WWT,Tk  J,e  4  4
Oppose  (w,k
4 ,
(5) Urban workers (w)  7  Oppose  (HW  ,;,Ww  4,e v  Bw4)  7
(6) Urban  govermnent  7  Oppose  [e v(Bk4  + BW'  + BU4,  + B  r1)]  7
bureaucrats (b)
(7) Urban students (s)  6  Oppose  (Hs4)  6
(8) Urban poor (u)  5  Oppose  (H u,jWu7,Bu4,)  5
(9) Rich farners  (r)  4  Favor  }  A  r4,  2  2
Oppose  (pAAt4,H  ,e
Total  66  33  31  2
Notes:  A = Value added in agriculture
B = Rents or Bribes
H = Transfers
L =  Political longevity (years)
M = Value added in manufacturing
T = Taxes
W = Wages (real)
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